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Abstract. This paper concerns the semantic difference between strong and 
weak necessity modals. First we identify a number of explananda: their well-
known intuitive difference in strength between ‘must’ and ‘ought’ as well as 
differences in connections to probabilistic considerations and acts of requiring 
and recommending. Here we argue that important extant analyses of the seman-
tic differences, though tailored to account for some of these aspects, fail to ac-
count for all. We proceed to suggest that the difference between ’ought’ and 
’must’ lies in how they relate to scalar and binary standards. Briefly put, 
must(φ) says that among the relevant alternatives, φ is selected by the relevant 
binary standard, whereas ought(φ) says that among the relevant alternatives, φ 
is selected by the relevant scale. Given independently plausible assumptions 
about how standards are provided by context, this explains the relevant differ-
ences discussed. 
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1 Introduction 
Many philosophers take ‘ought’ to be the canonical term for asserting and discussing 
moral obligations and requirements. Indeed, the first entry for ‘ought’ in many well-
known dictionaries identifies it as a word for duty or moral obligation. However, this 
proves problematic, as revealed by a (now) classic example:  
(1) Employees must wash hands. Non-employees really ought to wash their 
hands, too. [9] 
It is not ‘ought,’ but rather ‘must’ that indicates an obligation or duty, or what we are 
required to do. In (1), while it is clear that employees are required to wash their hands, 
‘ought’ seems to indicate a weaker claim on the non-employee—something more like 
a recommendation or exhortation. 
Since both ‘must’ and ‘ought’ (and closely related expressions like ‘have to’ and 
‘should’) play central roles in moral judgments and moral reasoning, it is important to 
ascertain what ‘ought’ does indicate, if not duties or obligations, as well as to under-
stand the difference(s) between ‘must’ and ‘ought.’1 That is the purpose of this paper. 
We suggest that the difference should be understood in terms of differently structured 
standards. ‘Ought’ relates to a scalar standard—a ranking of alternatives as better or 
worse. ‘Must’, by contrast, relates to a requiring standard—one that rules out all al-
ternatives not satisfying a certain condition. This distinction, we argue, can explain 
the variety of differences between the two locutions. At the same time, it is both par-
simonious, relying on independently motivated assumptions and existing resources 
within semantics, as well as conservative, being compatible with standard general 
approaches to the analysis of modals, and compatible with substantive views in nor-
mative ethics about what, in particular, ought to be done or ought to be the case. (For 
earlier discussions of the distinction, see [2,3,4,5], [9,10,11,12], [14], [17,18], [20].) 
In what follows, we spell out some relevant explananda and indicate why we find 
some extant accounts of these wanting (section 2), present our proposal and how it 
accounts for the explananda (section 3), and address some complications (section 4). 
2 Explananda 
We start with some of the data that should be captured by accounts of ‘ought’ (and its 
close relative ‘should’) and ‘must’ (and its relative ‘have to’):2  
 
Different flavors. Both ‘ought’ and ‘must’ famously come in different “flavors”, 
relating to different kinds of modalities:  
 
MORAL: “One ought to help one’s friends.” / “One must not murder.” 
PRUDENTIAL: “You ought to lock the garage; car thieves are active in the area!” / 
“We’ve been hit twice by violent burglars; we must protect ourselves.” 
BOULETIC: “Oh man, she ought to be here—she’d love this!” / “You simply must see 
the Rembrandt exhibit while it’s in town.” 
TELEOLOGICAL: “To get to Harlem, you ought to take the A-Train.” / “Actually, the 
subway broke down, the cabs are on-strike, and the heliport is closed for renovation; 
to get to Harlem, you have to walk.” 
EPISTEMIC: “He ought to be home within 10 minutes; he left an hour ago.” / “He must 
have arrived; I see he checked-in on Facebook.” 
 
The variety of modal flavors is of course familiar. Different modal claims clearly 
relate to different sorts of considerations. On a generic analysis of must(φ) in terms of 
quantifications over possibilities, it means in all relevant possibilities, φ. Within such 
                                                            
1  The fact that the distinction occurs across a variety of languages furthermore suggests that it 
tracks some stable and important cognitive distinction [10]. 
2  In this paper, we assume that what goes for ‘ought’ goes for ‘should,’ and that what goes for 
‘must’ goes for ‘have to,’ though in reality matters are more complicated, with regard to 
both connotations and syntax. We set aside such complications in pursuit of an understand-
ing of broader differences between the two categories of expressions, working on the as-
sumption that they encode two importantly different kinds of thought. 
an analysis, the different flavors correspond to different ways of selecting the relevant 
possibilities, ways that are in turn determined by context. In the case of epistemic 
‘must’, for example, the relevant possibilities might be those compatible with the 
evidence; in the case of moral ‘must’, the possibilities might be those that are morally 
best among the possibilities an agent can bring about at a time.  
What is important here is that the distinction between ‘ought’ and ‘must’ is felt 
across these flavors: exchanging one locution for the other in the examples above 
makes a striking difference across the board. In trying to account for the difference, 
our default assumption should be that the difference stems systematically from a dif-
ference in meaning between the two locutions. 
 
Intuitive difference in strength. As we have already noted, ‘ought’ seems weaker, in 
some sense, than ‘must’. One way of bringing out intuitive differences in strength is 
to substitute one for the other in a given sentence, such as:  
(2) When you are in town, you must/have to/should/ought to see the new Rem-
brandt exhibit. 
If one thinks that the Rembrandt exhibition is great and wants to recommend seeing it 
on this ground, the intuitive strength of one’s recommendation depends on whether 
we use ‘must/have to’ or ‘ought/should’: using the former would seem to express a 
stronger recommendation. 
A difference in strength is also suggested by the fact that it often seems reasonable 
to say that someone should or ought to do something while denying that she has to, 
but not the other way around:  
(3) You ought to attend class every day, but you don’t have to. 
(4) # You have to attend class every day, but I’m not saying that you should. 
(5) She ought to help her neighbor, but she doesn’t have to. 
(6) # She must help her neighbor …but it’s not as if she ought to. 
As (1), (3) and (5) illustrate, it might be perfectly natural to say that someone ought to 
do something while denying that he must, but as witnessed by (4) and (6), the reverse 
is problematic.  
The most straightforward way of understanding differences in strength is in terms 
of logical strength: must(φ) implies ought(φ), but not the other way around. This 
needs an obvious qualification, however, as both ‘ought’ and ‘must’ come in different 
flavors. Depending on how fine a distinction we make between these flavors, the two 
locutions might have different flavors within examples like (3) through (6). Consider 
again (1) (“Employees must wash hands. Non-employees really ought to wash their 
hands, too”). Here, ‘must’ might be understood as legal or policy-based, whereas 
‘ought’ is more naturally understood as moral. Moreover, if there is a shift, then clear-
ly we can have cases where both have to/must(φ) and should/ought(~φ) are felicitous 
(even assuming that should not(φ) implies not should(φ)): 
(7) I’ve now read the regulations: you must hand in the documents by the end of 
today. But you really shouldn’t. We can save lives if we hold on to them until 
tomorrow. 
The datum here, then, is that when must(φ) and ought(φ) have the same flavor, the 
former seems stronger. Exactly how this is spelled out obviously depends both on 
how sameness of flavor is to be understood and on the semantics of the two locutions. 
Perhaps the best-known attempt to represent the differences in strength between 
‘ought’ and ‘must’ comes from Kai von Fintel and Sabine Iatridou [9,10]. Following 
Angelica Kratzer [7,8], they take must(φ) to mean (simplifying somewhat) φ holds in 
all the highest ranking accessible possible worlds. The conversational background 
provides a “modal base” determining the set of worlds accessible from a world w, and 
an “ordering source” determining the ranking of worlds. In the case of moral ‘must’, 
the ordering source is a set of propositions describing a morally ideal situation; in the 
case of a legal ‘must’, a legally ideal situation. Their suggestion is that ought(φ) is 
similar, but that it takes a second ordering source which orders the accessible worlds 
favored by the primary ordering source. So if we say that  
(8) Liz ought to ψ; in fact she must. 
and if ‘must’ and ‘ought to’ take the same primary ordering source, we are saying that  
(9) Liz ψs in all accessible worlds favored by O that are also favored by O’; in 
fact, she ψs in all accessible worlds favored by O. 
Since the second ordering source (O’) restricts the worlds that φ are said to hold in, 
the ought-claim in the first conjunct is weaker than the must-claim in the second. 
Obviously, the proposal straightforwardly captures a difference in strength between 
the two locutions (cf. [12]).3  But there seem to be (a) cases where two ordering 
                                                            
3  von Fintel and Iatridou [9] suggest that ‘anankastic’ oughts—sentences of the form ‘if you 
want X, you ought to Y’ or ‘to X, you ought to Y’—are best understood to involve two or-
dering sources. That would let the explicit goal (X) operate on the first, thus ensuring that it 
isn’t trumped by other goals such that to X you ought to Y comes out as true even when Y-
ing would in no way promote X. They furthermore think that this is best explained under the 
assumption that ‘ought’ takes two ordering sources generally. But we do not see why claus-
es like “if you want to X” or “in order to X” cannot equally well work to introduce a privi-
leged ordering source.  
  In a more recent paper [10], von Fintel and Iatridou also note that in many languages, 
weak necessity modals are expressed using a combination of strong necessity modals and 
temporally unmotivated past tense morphology characteristic of counterfactuals. They take 
this to suggest that weak necessity modals operate with two ordering sources, but the con-
nection they propose between the past morphology and an extra ordering source seems 
largely ad hoc. In the case of counterfactuals, the past tense morphology does not introduce 
an extra ordering source restricting the relevant possibilities, but instead relaxes constraints 
on the possible to include what might be epistemically impossible. We should expect it to do 
something similar here and speculate that in the case of necessity modals, it indicates a wid-
ening of the considerations grounding the relevant selection of accessible alternatives: 
whereas ‘must’ encodes a binary condition decisively favoring some alternatives over oth-
ers, ‘ought’ encodes a scale given which such a condition would be one among many possi-
ble conditions determining an alternatives position on that scale (see Section 3). For an ex-
ample of such weakening by past morphology at work in the case of modals, consider the 
two close synonyms of ‘ought’ in Swedish: ‘bör’ and its morphologically past ‘borde’. Both 
sources are at play but ‘must’ still seems appropriate, and (b) cases where ‘ought’ 
seems clearly appropriate even though it is unclear what primary ordering source 
might be in play. 
For an example of (a), suppose that we are considering whether to schedule a sem-
inar on Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday. Learning that the speaker can’t make it on 
Monday, we cross that day off our list, and remembering that we had dearly promised 
to leave Tuesday open for a departmental meeting, we cross Tuesday off our list too, 
leaving Wednesday. Even though we have two salient operative sources for our selec-
tion of the remaining alternative, it would be natural for us to conclude that: 
(10) We have to schedule the seminar for Wednesday.  
At least, it seems that this would be natural if we took our previous promise to be 
clearly decisive.  
For an example of (b), suppose that we hear of some natural disaster. Thinking 
about the urgent needs, we might naturally say: 
(11) We ought to contribute to disaster relief. 
It is not clear, however, what the primary ordering source would be in this case, or 
that we need to identify one to know very well what was meant by (11). At the very 
least, it is not clear that the considerations triggering our utterance involve focusing 
on anything other than the fact that it is better if we contribute to disaster relief.  
For these reasons, the number of salient ordering sources cannot itself be what dis-
tinguishes ‘must’ from ‘ought’: instead, there is something about the sources or our 
attitude towards them that favors one of the locutions over the other. And if we had an 
account of that difference in ordering sources, it might well be that we could explain 
the difference in strength without taking ‘ought’ to operate with a secondary ordering 
source.  
 
Requirements vs. recommendations. As illustrated by several of our examples 
above, ‘must’ is naturally used to express requirements, whereas ‘ought’ is naturally 
used to express something like recommendations. This is something that an analysis 
of these terms should let us explain. However, a few words are needed about the 
strength of the connections between ‘ought’ and recommendations, and between 
‘must’ and requirements. 
At one extreme, one might think of these connections as mere connotations, at-
tached to the locutions by historical accident rather than grounded in the semantics. 
This seems implausible, as the connections seem to hold cross-linguistically. At the 
other extreme, one might take them as part of the meaning of the terms. For example, 
Mike Ridge analyses ‘must’ as relating to standards that require certain actions or 
states of mind and ‘ought’ as relating to standards that recommend. Recommending 
and requiring standards are in turn understood in terms of the distinction between 
kinds of speech acts: in recommending something, we are typically disposed to toler-
ate that someone ignores our recommendations; in requiring something, by contrast, 
                                                                                                                                               
are weaker than the equivalent of ‘must’ (‘måste’), but ‘borde’ is weaker than ‘bör’, indicat-
ing more uncertainty or less decisive reasons. 
we are disposed to insist on compliance, and impose sanctions for non-compliance 
([14], ch. 1, § 3). 
As will be clear, we think that the connection between ‘must’ and ‘ought’ and the-
se speech acts is no mere coincidence, but we doubt that it is part of the meaning of 
the terms. The first problem is that the connection seems insufficiently tight to ground 
a difference in meaning. Speakers seem to use ‘must’ in a variety of contexts where 
they are not disposed to impose sanctions or insist on compliance in relation to the 
standards invoked. For example it is unclear whether we should expect any more 
insisting or sanctions for non-compliance from someone uttering (2) with ‘ought’ or 
‘should’ rather than ‘must’. 
A different and perhaps more serious problem arises in the case of epistemic 
modals and uses of ‘must’ that express nomological or logical necessity. The problem 
is that what logically, nomologically or epistemically ought or must be the case often 
need not be an action: 
(12) It must/ought to be snowing in Stockholm by now. 
(13) When temperature increases, either volume or pressure must increase too. 
Obviously, we do not normally recommend or require that it be snowing in Stock-
holm or that volume or pressure increase. Ridge suggests that statements expressing 
epistemic modals (such as (12)) say that what the relevant standards require or rec-
ommend is that we believe a certain proposition (e.g. that it is snowing in Stockholm). 
That might seem plausible (though perhaps less so for nomological or logical modals, 
as he acknowledges). But it introduces a compositionality problem: whereas (3) 
through (2) represent the actions recommended or required by the relevant standards, 
(12) or (13) do not in any clear way represent any believing, only a content that can be 
believed. Somehow, in the case of practical must(φ) or ought(φ), the relevant stand-
ards would concern φ, whereas in the epistemic (or nomological or logical) case, it 
would apply to our believing φ. A more uniform account would be preferable. 
For these reasons we do not think that it is part of the meaning of ‘must’ and 
‘ought’ that they express or otherwise semantically relate to different levels of intol-
erance of non-compliance. But it is clear enough that ‘must’ is particularly well suited 
to express requirements in the sanction-implicating sense, and this is something that 
calls out for an explanation. 
 
Probability, conditionality, and collective commitments. Looking at epistemic uses 
of ‘ought’ and ‘must,’ one might think that the difference between the terms has to do 
with certainty or uncertainty. If one says that it must be snowing in Stockholm right 
now, one might seem to imply that we can be certain that it is snowing, or, more care-
fully, certain enough to consider the matter closed and not up for debate. If one says 
that it ought to be snowing, the implication is instead that it is probable or believable 
that it is snowing, or that a default assumption that it is snowing is in order, and one 
seems to leave the matter open for discussion. An analysis of the difference between 
‘ought’ and ‘must’ should help us understand this difference.  
As with the distinction between recommendations and requirements, one might 
think that the tendency of ‘must’ to express states of certainty or of considering a 
matter closed is more or less tightly connected to the meaning of the term, and simi-
larly for the tendency of ‘ought’ to express probabilistic judgments or default assump-
tions. Suppose, for example, that we say that someone must or ought morally to lend a 
helping hand, thereby expressing that moral considerations require or support that 
action. Here one might further think that the ought-judgment, as opposed to the must-
judgment, semantically leaves open that there might be stronger moral reasons not to 
lend a helping hand, or that some other action might also achieve whatever ends or 
satisfy whatever ideals we are concerned with, though with lower probability, or per-
haps that it leaves open that other parties of the conversation do not share the priori-
ties on which one based one’s judgment.4  
We do not see that the phenomenon generalizes in that way, however. Many think 
that there are cases where, all told and without remaining uncertainty, moral reasons 
favor but do not require a certain act. Morally speaking, it is what the agent should or 
ought to do, but not what he must do; it is morally recommended, but not mandatory. 
The difference here seems to be between the kinds of reasons involved, not their cer-
tainty or unqualified nature. Or take a prudential example, where we are faced with 
the choice between two routes to work, Highway 9 and Route 17, offering different 
driving conditions and different scenery. Given the current traffic, the weather and 
our mood, we judge that Route 17 is somewhat better all things considered. Though 
the difference is relatively small (while Route 17 is a little longer, it is prettier and a 
little less bumpy), we agree about the relative weights of these considerations and the 
facts involved, and so consider the matter settled. Now compare:  
(14) We ought to/should take Route 17. 
(15) ? We must/have to take Route 17. 
                                                            
4  Stephen Finlay has defended the suggestion that must(φ) means that φ holds in all the rele-
vant possibilities (where the relevant possibilities in the case of practical or bouletic modals 
are those in which some relevant end is realized), whereas ought(φ) means roughly that φ is 
more likely than other relevant possibilities (see e.g. [3,4] and [5], §3.2). Aynat Rubinstein 
[15,16] distinguishes two kinds of priorities on which (non-epistemic) modal claims are 
based: those that support ‘must’ (i.e. provide a primary ordering source, in the von Fintel & 
Iatridou framework) are ones to which conversational participants are presupposed to be 
committed; those that support ‘ought’ (provide secondary ordering sources) lack that pre-
supposition. Whereas Finlay takes ‘ought’ to leave room for uncertainty about the achieve-
ment of the relevant end, what Rubinstein takes ‘ought’ to leave unsettled (in the conversa-
tional context) are the preferences involved, i.e. more like the ends of Finlay’s account. Sim-
ilarly, and simplifying quite a bit, Alex Silk [17] suggests that ought(φ) is distinguished 
from must(φ) in that ought(φ) represents φ as holding in all relevant possibilities conditional 
on the applicability of the ordering source, whereas must(φ) represents φ holding in all rele-
vant possibilities unconditionally. Much earlier, Jones and Pörn [12] proposed that must(φ) 
indicates that ought(φ) holds unconditionally or inescapably, under relevant ideal and non-
ideal conditions. Unfortunately for our purposes, they say little about how relevant non-ideal 
conditions are selected, or how this might apply to epistemic ‘ought’, and the plausibility of 
the suggestion crucially depends on getting that selection just right. (We thank an anony-
mous referee for pointing us to Jones and Pörn’s proposal.) 
(14) strikes us as perfectly felicitous, whereas (15) seems out of place. (Must we take 
Route 17? No, that is putting it too strongly. We may take Highway 9, though it 
wouldn’t be as good.) But suppose that must(φ) unconditionally represented φ as se-
lected by considerations of the relevant flavor and presupposes that we are collective-
ly committed to the priorities involved. Suppose also that ought(φ) semantically 
leaves open the possibility that considerations supporting φ are outweighed, or repre-
sent φ as having merely probabilistic support, or takes priorities that the parties of the 
conversation are not committed to. Then contrary to what we find, (15) should have 
been perfectly fine, and (14) too weak.5  
For these reasons, we think that while ‘ought’ is often better suited for contexts of 
uncertainty and that this calls for an explanation, it is not part of the semantics of 
‘ought’ that it leaves open that some alternative is better, all facts considered. 
3 SOS: ‘ought’, ‘must’, and the structure of standards 
In the previous section, we listed phenomena that an account of the difference be-
tween ‘ought’ and ‘must’ should account for, and indicated problems for extant anal-
yses of the difference to do so. Though we cannot pretend to have shown that these 
problems cannot be dealt with, we do hope to show how our own proposal can ac-
count for the phenomena in comparatively straightforward ways, and that it is worthy 
of further consideration. 
The basic intuition behind our proposal is this. In thinking that something must or 
has to be case, we are thinking that, among relevant alternatives, it uniquely satisfies 
some salient condition. In the case of teleological ‘must’, it is the only alternative 
compatible with achieving the relevant goal; in the case of epistemic ‘must’, it is the 
only alternative compatible with the evidence; in the case of a moral ‘must’, it is the 
only that satisfies some moral requirement, and so forth. In thinking that something 
ought to or should be the case, by contrast, we have in mind considerations seen as 
providing overall sufficient support for selecting that alternative. In the former case, 
we have in mind a requiring condition or standard, or requirement; in the latter a sca-
lar standard of some sort, providing considerations based on which we can see alter-
natives as more or less supported.  
Obviously not all scales and requirements ground oughts and musts. We do not 
think that something ought or must epistemically be the case because it is most un-
likely or because it is the only alternative incompatible with the evidence. Similarly, 
we do not conclude that we ought to do something on the ground that this is most 
unlikely to give us what we want, or most likely to give us what we do not want. 
                                                            
5  Finlay ([5] Ch. 6 §6) suggests a pragmatic explanation of the difference. We currently think 
that our account is more straightforward, and avoids other problems with Finlay’s account, 
in particular problems with accounting for how alternatives are compared not only with re-
spect to likelihood of achieving an end, but with respect to how likely they are to provide 
amounts of various valued quantities. Finlay ([5]: Ch. 7) has an extensive discussion of this 
problem, but we are not yet convinced that he can fully handle he problem. 
 
Generally, the scales and requirements on which we ground ought and must-
judgments are ones that we take to be relevant in deliberation about what proposition 
to realize in action, have a positive attitude towards, or believe, depending on whether 
we are engaged in practical, evaluative or epistemic deliberation. Differently put, the 
standards that ground our judgments are standards for practical, evaluative or epis-
temic endorsement of propositions. This is not to say that we make ought and must-
judgments only when we are in the business of forming beliefs, intentions, or atti-
tudes, for standards can be applied from other points of view than the first-person 
present-tense deliberation. We can apply them in deliberating on behalf of someone 
else who has to make a decision (as potential advisors), or from the point of view of 
an unspecified agent in a hypothetical situation, perhaps with different beliefs or ac-
cess to different information than we have. Nor is it to say that the standards in ques-
tion must be standards that we ourselves endorse in full detail. We can make practical 
ought or must-judgments in relation to goals that we do not ourselves assign any prac-
tical authority, thinking what the movie villain ought to do to avoid the police, and we 
can reason theoretically from premises that we do not in fact accept. Still, the inter-
pretation and use of ‘ought’ and ‘must’ seems to operate under the expectation that 
standards encoded by ‘ought’ and ‘must’ are possible standards for practical, evalua-
tive or epistemic endorsement. 
Here, then, is the basic idea of our proposal. First, both ought(φ) and must(φ) select 
some alternative for (practical, preferential, theoretical) endorsement at the exclusion 
of others. If we think of alternatives as propositions, the simplest case is one where 
the alternatives consist of a proposition, φ, and its negation, ~φ. In this case, must(φ) 
and ought(φ) imply ~must(~φ) and ~ought(~φ), respectively (ignoring dialetheism). 
Second, ought(φ) and must(φ) differ as to the grounds, or standard, of selection. 
‘Ought’ semantically encodes a scalar standard—a ‘scale’—which selects an alterna-
tive based on its position on that scale. ‘Must’ encodes a binary standard or a condi-
tion—a ‘requirement’—which selects an alternative fulfilling that condition.6 Call this 
                                                            
6  Compare Sloman’s early [18] suggestion that practical ought(φ) means that φ is, or is a 
necessary condition for, the best of the possibilities in some contextually determined class Z, 
whereas must(φ) means that φ is the only alternative. 
  The proposal in this paper also shares obvious similarities with Daniel Lassiter’s recent 
highly interesting proposal that modals in general relate to scales, that ought(φ) means 
(roughly) that φ exceeds some contextually salient threshold on some contextually salient 
scale (e.g. of probability or expected value) to a significantly higher degree among salient 
alternatives, whereas must(φ) means (roughly) that it is the only relevant alternative passing 
a very high threshold ([11] Ch. 6). (We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us to 
Lassiter’s dissertation.) Much of Lassiter’s discussion strikes us as illuminating and plausi-
ble, but our ambition here is somewhat different than Lassiter’s. Our primary goal is to say 
something general (and necessarily schematic) about the different contributions of ‘ought’ 
and ‘must’ that might explain differences in behavior between the two locutions across the 
various flavors, whereas Lassiter aims to provide detailed truth conditions for epistemic and 
deontic modals, respectively. Though we lack space to show this here, we think that given 
plausible assignments of scalar and binary standards, the general account outlined here can 
accommodate crucial aspects of Lassiter’s explanations. 
the ‘Structure of Standards’, or ‘SOS’ account of the difference between ‘ought’ and 
‘must’:  
 
OUGHT(φ): Among the relevant alternatives, φ is selected by the relevant scale. 
MUST(φ): Among the relevant alternatives, φ is selected by the relevant requirement. 
 
We do not here endorse a specific way of understanding alternatives, but put in the 
most familiar terms of quantification over possible worlds, we can think of the rele-
vant alternatives as sets of possible worlds, and the selection of an alternative φ as a 
restriction of the union of these to those in which φ holds. Prior to the selection en-
coded by a particular must(φ) or ought(φ) judgment, relevant alternatives will typical-
ly have been restricted in various way. In the case of practical oughts, for example, 
alternatives will have been restricted to those that the relevant agent is capable of 
bringing about at some specific time; in the theoretical counterparts, global skeptical 
alternatives might have been ruled out. Some such ‘preselections’ would correspond 
roughly to Kratzerian modal bases. Others will be based on something akin to 
Kratzerian ordering sources: perhaps we have already restricted our attention to alter-
natives in which we achieve some goal, and select among those using, say, a require-
ment that a promise be held, or a scale of degrees of convenience. A crucial difference 
between this proposal and that of von Fintel and Iatridou is that what determines 
whether ‘ought’ or ‘must’ is the appropriate locution is the structure of the salient 
selection (or ordering) source—is it a requirement or a scale?—not the number of 
ordering sources at play.7  
For illustration, consider again:  
(1) Employees must wash hands. Non-employees really ought to wash their 
hands, too. 
When interpreting the ‘must’-sentence in (1), one identifies as best one can the re-
quirement or the rough kind of requirement made most salient by the occurrence of 
‘must’ in the context: in this case that it is a practical requirement, and perhaps more 
precisely one backed up by company policy, or perhaps legislation. The sentence is 
then understood as expressing that the requirement in question selects the alternative 
that employees wash their hands over the alternative that they do not. When interpret-
ing the ‘ought’-sentence, one instead identifies the scale or kinds of scales that are 
made most salient by the occurrence of ‘ought’ in the context: in this case perhaps a 
scale of social or moral desirability, a scale on which hygiene might affect the ranking 
of alternatives. The sentence is then understood as expressing that considerations on 
this scale select the alternative in which non-employees wash their hands. 
                                                            
7  SOS assumes no particular account of how, exactly, alternatives are selected or ranked given 
salient considerations of a certain type (moral, prudential, epistemic, etc.). We thus take it to 
be compatible with a variety of existing and possible suggestion (for relevant recent work 
the selection of alternatives, see e.g. [1], [6], [19]). More generally, we think that the pro-
posal could be worked out in a variety of frameworks for modeling the content of modals, 
not only the broadly Kratzerian approach used here for illustration because of its familiarity. 
In the rest of this section, we explain how this proposal accounts for the data; in the 
section that follows we discuss some complications.  
 
Different flavors. On the SOS proposal, both oughts and musts come in different 
flavors because encoded standards of both the requiring and scalar kind come in dif-
ferent flavors: moral, prudential, bouletic, teleological, and epistemic. At least intui-
tively, most of us take morality to require us to act or not to act in certain ways, and to 
favor actions and states of affairs as morally better than others. Prudence might simi-
larly require some actions and favor others as better than the alternatives. This makes 
for moral and prudential musts and oughts. Similarly, the achievement of certain ends 
or the satisfaction of certain desires might require certain actions or states of affairs, 
and some actions might be more rational or desirable means to certain ends than oth-
ers, making for teleological and bouletic musts and oughts. Finally, epistemic alterna-
tives might be selected by the requirement that they be compatible with evidence, or 
by their degree of likelihood or believability thus making for the distinction between 
epistemic musts and oughts. SOS thus promises to account for the distinction between 
musts and oughts in the variety of areas where it is encountered, based on an intuitive-
ly available distinction between relevant kinds of grounds. 
  
Intuitive difference in strength. SOS does not itself tell us that ‘must’ is stronger 
than ‘ought’, as ‘must’ and ‘ought’ encode differently structured standards. Still, 
when focusing on cases where must(φ) and ought(φ) have the same flavor, it gives us 
reasons to expect cases of ought(φ) but not must(φ) as well as reasons not to expect 
cases of must(φ) but not ought(φ), or cases of must(φ) but ought(~φ). 
The key here is to understand what it is to take must(φ) and ought(φ) to have the 
same flavor. A natural first proposal is that it is to see the relevant requirement and 
the relevant scale as simultaneously relevant to the selection from the same set of 
relevant alternatives. They might be relevant to the same choice between propositions 
to believe on the basis of evidence (as in the epistemic case), or the same choice be-
tween propositions to wish true based on whether they satisfy relevant desires (as in 
the case of bouletic modals). Or they might be relevant to the same choice between 
actions on the basis of features relevant to morality, to prudence, or to the achieve-
ment of specified goals (as in the case of moral, prudential or teleological modalities).  
To see the requirement and the scale as providing a coherent set of considerations 
is in effect to see them as grounding a scale in the sense we are operating with here: a 
set of possible considerations based on which we select alternatives that have suffi-
cient support. But notice that if we see the requirement as a consideration that deter-
mines an alternative’s position on a scale and continue to see it as a requirement—as 
a condition which selects some alternatives in favor of others—then we will see the 
scale as ranking the alternatives that satisfy the requirement higher than the alterna-
tives that do not. From this it follows that if something uniquely satisfies the relevant 
requirement it must also be the highest-ranking alternative relative to this scale. Con-
sequently, no other alternative ought to be relative to that scale, and insofar as we take 
it to be sufficiently supported by the considerations on the scale, it will also be seen as 
what ought to be, relative to that scale. But conversely, nothing prevents one among 
several alternatives that satisfy the requirement to be uniquely selected by further, 
non-requiring considerations relevant to the scale, giving us a case where something 
ought to be the case, though it doesn’t have to be. Given SOS, this is the explanation 
of why must(φ) seems logically stronger than ought(φ): it is an effect of what it is for 
a condition to be a requirement and what it is for a scale and a requirement to be seen 
as of the same flavor. 
Another way in which SOS predicts intuitive differences in strength of recommen-
dations emerges in contexts where (e.g.) one recommends seeing the Rembrandt ex-
hibition using ‘must/have to’ or ‘should/ought to’. Using the former seems to express 
a stronger recommendation than the latter: the question is why. According to SOS, if 
one uses ‘have to’, one is treating the relevant considerations as grounding a require-
ment, i.e. as constituting a condition that itself rules out other alternatives. By con-
trast, if one uses ‘ought to’, one is treating the relevant considerations as ranking the 
alternative in question (seeing the exhibit) best, so that perhaps the winning alterna-
tive came out by a slim margin. For the same considerations to ground a ‘have to’ 
rather than an ‘ought to’ is to treat it them, in a straightforward way, as decisive. 
 
Requirements vs. recommendations. If we understand the speech act of requiring as 
involving a disposition to insist on compliance and impose sanctions for non-
compliance, it is natural that it will be tied to requirements of the sort encoded by 
‘must’ on the SOS account, i.e. to whether some binary condition is satisfied. Issues 
of vagueness to the side, insistence and sanctions are most naturally or even neces-
sarily tied to binary conditions, considerations that are either violated or satisfied: 
without such a condition it is unclear what is insisted upon, or to what the sanctions 
are tied. To recommend something, by contrast, is to express that it is appropriate for 
some relevant purpose. In some cases, it might be that the recommended alternative is 
appropriate in virtue of being the only alternative satisfying some salient requirement: 
if our question concerns what to do when in town, we might think that missing out on 
the Rembrandt exhibition disqualifies any alternative, i.e. treat seeing the exhibition 
as a requirement, and so express our recommendation of this action using ‘must’. In 
other cases, however, we recommend one alternative over others because it ranks 
higher on some relevant non-binary scale, and in these cases the recommendation will 
be expressed using ‘ought’. So SOS correctly predicts that acts of requiring are tied to 
‘must’ and ‘have to’ rather than to ‘ought’ and ‘should’, whereas recommendations 
can be expressed using either sort of expression, depending on the ground for the 
recommendation. 
 
Probability, conditionality, and collective commitments. We do not take the phe-
nomena considered thus far to necessarily be beyond the ken of alternative accounts 
of the difference between ‘ought’ and ‘must.’ Contextualist accounts can make room 
for a variety of flavors, and accounts that take ‘ought’ to involve some element of 
probability, conditionality or lack of agreement about priorities might be able to han-
dle differences in strength and relations to recommendations and requirements. How-
ever, we think that SOS is particularly well suited to account for phenomena motivat-
ing the latter sorts of accounts while leaving room for cases involving neither uncer-
tainty nor hedging. 
Given SOS, it is clear why ‘ought’ is preferred to ‘must’ when the modal judgment 
is grounded in considerations that might be outweighed or undermined by further 
considerations, including probabilistic considerations. The reason is exactly that in 
such cases the modal judgment is grounded not in some requirement, but in consid-
erations that raise the score of the alternative in question on the relevant scale. In the 
case of epistemic modals, we will judge that something must be the case when its not 
being the case violates the requirement of compatibility with the evidence. But when 
the possibility in question is merely highly likely, other possibilities meet the re-
quirement of compatibility and all we can say is that it ought to be the case. In the 
case of practical modals, we will judge that something must be done when it is the 
only alternative that satisfies the relevant requirements, but when one alternative is 
selected because it strikes a better balance of risks and opportunities, we will judge 
that it ought to be done. Similarly, in the case of bouletic modals, when we take some-
thing to be the only satisfactory alternative, we think that it must be the case, but 
when we just take something to be more satisfactory than the alternatives such that 
further considerations might change that balance, or because it strikes a better balance 
of risks and opportunities, we think that it ought to be the case. 
While explaining why ‘ought’ is preferred to ‘must’ under circumstances of uncer-
tainty, SOS allows that ‘ought’ might be preferable even in cases without uncertainty. 
Recall the case where we are considering what route to take, and that we agree, with-
out any significant remaining uncertainty, that Route 17 is on the balance a little bet-
ter than Highway 9. We might now naturally conclude that we ought to take Route 17 
though it would be unnatural to conclude that we must. Taking Route 17 is selected 
by a salient scalar standard weighing various considerations, but there is no salient 
requirement that rules out taking Highway 9. 
4 Non-requiring thresholds and scale-based requirements  
It is not our business in this paper to propose a fully-fledged analysis of any one par-
ticular flavor of ‘ought’ or ‘must’. But epistemic uses of ‘ought’ might raise a ques-
tion about the SOS proposal. At first blush, the proposal applies nicely to epistemic 
‘ought’ and ‘must’: intuitively, we think that something must (epistemically) be the 
case when we think that it is the only alternative satisfying the requirement of com-
patibility with the evidence, and we think that something ought (epistemically) to be 
the case if it is sufficiently well supported by the evidence, i.e. scores high enough on 
some scale of evidential support. The problem is that having a sufficiently high score 
on an evidential scale itself seems to be a requirement: a requirement for rational 
believability, say. If it is, SOS might seem to predict that ‘must’ would be felicitous 
whenever ‘ought’ is, collapsing the distinction. 
Notice that it doesn’t help here to say that it is a requirement that refers to a thresh-
old on a scale, for many requirements that ground musts do too: guests must leave a 
bar after a certain time (time provides a scale), and drivers must keep a certain dis-
tance to other vehicles (distance is another scale). Nor do we think that it helps to say 
that the thresholds that ground ought-judgments as opposed to must-judgments are 
essentially comparative, selecting the alternative that scores highest on the relevant 
scale. It is of course true that many ought-judgments do seem to select the highest-
scoring alternative: it is often the case that we ought to do something because it is the 
best alternative. Unfortunately, epistemic ought doesn’t seem to be grounded in com-
parisons in the required way, instead relying on thresholds (perhaps of a vague and 
context dependent nature): in cases where alternative A is 45% likely and B 55% 
likely, we are generally not warranted in saying that B ought to be the case, though 
one alternative is clearly more likely.8 
Even if epistemic ought could be understood as selecting the most likely alterna-
tive, another problem remains: comparisons on scales can ground requirements and 
must-judgments. Suppose that we judge that some action is the best alternative avail-
able to us. Given SOS we will also naturally judge this as what we ought to do. But 
one might think that there is a rational requirement to do what is optimal. If one does, 
then it should make sense to say that we not only ought to do it, but that we have to, 
rationally speaking. This, we think, sounds just right: because it is best, we ought to 
do it, and if we are rationally required to do what is best, we have to do it, rationally 
speaking. But whether we think that there is a rational optimality requirement or not, 
the very selection of one option over others because it is optimal—the selection that 
we have said is operative in practical ought judgments—itself employs an optimality 
requirement: suboptimal alternatives are rejected. On the SOS proposal, one might 
think, this would mean that we should be willing to apply ‘must’ whenever we apply 
‘ought’, which we clearly are not. 
The solution to both these problems, about epistemic ought and about requirements 
of optimality, lies in the fact that not all requirements are the most salient require-
ments in a given context. The relevant distinction between requiring and scalar stand-
ards concerns the salient structure of the considerations grounding the selection of 
some relevant alternative. When we ask what requirement a given use of ‘must’ will 
convey, what matters is thus the relative salience of different requirements, which is 
affected by how easily we can think of the requirements and how informative or rele-
vant the idea is that a certain alternative satisfies that requirement. 
First apply this to the question of why the threshold that grounds epistemic oughts 
doesn’t ground epistemic musts. To answer this question, we should ask what re-
quirement is most salient in an epistemic reasoning. Here, compare the requirement 
that an alternative is compatible with whatever information is taken for granted (i.e. 
treated as evidential ground) with the requirement that it reaches above some thresh-
old of evidential support required for believability. Both requirements are important, 
but the second is much less clearly binary in that it allows for more borderline cases, 
and thus less striking as a requirement. Because of this, when we ask in an epistemic 
                                                            
8  On Finlay’s account, epistemic ought(φ) (and indeed all oughts) means (roughly) φ is most 
likely. Elsewhere we raise problems for this view and Finlay’s attempts to explain away 
certain counterexamples. Since our concern here is to argue that SOS is tenable even if a 
highest likelihood account of epistemic ought is incorrect, we do not repeat the arguments 
here: should they be mistaken our view here has one less problem to deal with. 
setting whether something must be the case, the SOS proposal suggests that ‘must’ 
will pick out the former requirement rather than the latter.9  
Next consider the question about why the optimality requirement apparently opera-
tive in practical ought-judgments does not ground practical must-judgments. Again, 
the question is what the most salient requirements are when we are making the judg-
ment, now in contexts of practical deliberation. On the one hand we have require-
ments on action backed up by preferences, emotional reaction, moral conscience and 
law, along with a variety of formal and informal sanctions. On the other hand, we 
have a general requirement to pick the best alternative, a requirement that is implicitly 
operative whenever we make a practical ought-judgment. Here, we suggest, the for-
mer sorts of requirements should be much more salient. For example, when we deny 
that we must or have to take Route 17 though we think that we ought to, the require-
ment to do what is best just does not spring to mind, and it is unlikely that it will ex-
cept in philosophical contexts.10 For these reasons, the existence of optimality re-
quirements does not undermine the SOS proposal. 
 
5 Conclusion  
What we have offered here does not comprise full analyses of ‘ought’ and ‘must’. We 
have not proposed a formal semantics for either locution, and have left open whether 
a full analysis should be purely truth-conditional or involve expressivist elements. 
Furthermore, we have only briefly discussed some of the pragmatics involved in the 
production and interpretation of the relevant modal claims, and have said nothing 
about how to understand disagreement about what ought to be done or ought to be the 
case among interlocutors who have different standards in mind or access to different 
evidence. 
For these reasons, our proposal is best seen as a kind of analysis of the modal se-
mantics and pragmatics of the two locutions and their relatives—one that we think 
best explains their different behaviors. Contrary to a common assumption, it is not 
‘ought’ but rather ‘must’ and ‘have to’ that are typically used to talk about obliga-
tions. ‘Ought’ is used to express something weaker, such as recommendations or ex-
hortations. This difference, we argued, is naturally and plausibly understood in terms 
of different kinds of standards: ‘ought’ and ‘should’ encode salient scalar standards 
for selecting alternatives, whereas ‘must’ and ‘have to’ encode binary standards.  
                                                            
9  The condition that alternatives be compatible with the evidential ground can be understood 
as requiring logical compatibility. However, it might more plausibly be understood as re-
quirement that they not be rendered insignificantly likely by the evidential ground. If so, our 
proposal would have as a consequence something close to what Lassiter ([11], pp. 89–92) 
takes to be required to account for the connection between epistemic ‘must’ and claims 
about likelihood.  
10  Compare: when thinking about why a house burnt down, we are unlikely to focus on the fact 
that the air contained oxygen, even though our thinking about the matter would change dras-
tically if we no longer assumed that it did. 
The type of analysis we propose not only offers an explanation of this difference in 
strength across the various “flavors” of ‘ought’ and ‘must.’ It also sheds light on what 
relations ought-judgments and must-judgments bear and do not bear to uncertainty 
and acts of recommending and requiring, without imposing implausibly strong con-
straints on either the role of probability or on the illocutionary acts performed using 
these locutions.  
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